Page:Jewish Encyclopedia Volume 2.pdf/498

448 THE JEWISH ENCYCLOPEDIA

Bahya "ben Joseph

and that consequently he lived at a later time than is assumed by Kaufmann, who holds that both Ibn Gabirol and Gazzali were indebted to Bahya (see

'both,

Kaufmann,

I.e.

pp. 194, 198. 207: Rosin, "Die Ethik

des Maimonides,"

Jahrb." v. 71 et seg.). divided into ten sections termed "gates," corresponding to the ten fundamental principles which, according to his view, p. 13; Briill,"

The "Hobot ha-Lebabot"

is

constitute man's spiritual life. The essence of all spirituality being the recognition of God as the one maker and designer of all things, Bahya makes the

"Sha'ar ha-Yihud " (Gate of the Divine Unit}', or of the monotheistic faith) the first and foremost section. Taking the Jewish Confession, " Hear, O Israel the Lord our God the Lord is One, as a starting-point, the author emphasizes the fact that for religious life it is not so much a matter of the intellect to know God as it is a matter of the heart to own and to love Him. Yet it is not sufficient to accept this belief in God without thinking, as the child does, or because the fathers have taught so, as do the blind believers in tradition, who have no opinion of their own and are led by others. Nor should the belief in God be such as might in any way be liable to be understood in a corporeal or anthropomorphic sense, but it should rest on conviction which is the result of the

''

most comprehensive knowledge and research. Far from demanding blind belief which is His anything but meritorious the Torah, Religious on the contrary, appeals to reason and Phiknowledge as proofs of God's existlosophy. ence, as is shown, for instance, in Deut. iv. 6. It is therefore a duty incumbent

—

upon every one

—

make God an

object of speculative reason and knowledge, in order to arrive at true faith. Without intending to give a compendium of metaphysics, Bahya furnishes in this first gate a system of religious philosophy that is not without merit. Unfamiliar with Avicenna's works, which replaced Neoplatonic mysticism by clear Aristotelian thought, Bahya, like all the Arabian philosophers and theologians before him, bases his arguments upon Creation. He starts from the following three premises: (1) Nothing creates itself, since the act of creating necessitates its existence (so also Saadia, "Emunot," i. 2); (2) the causes of things are necessarily limited in number, and lead to the presumption of a first cause which is necessarily self-existent, having neither beginning nor end, because everything that has an end must needs have a beginning; (3) all composite beings have a beginning; and a cause must necessarily be created. The world is beautifully arranged and furnished like a great house, of which the sky forms the ceiling, the earth the floor, the stars the lamps, and man is the proprietor, to whom the three kingdoms— the animal, the vegeto

—

are submitted for use, each of table, and the mineral Nor these being composed of the four elements. does the celestial sphere, composed of a fifth element "Quinta Essentia," according to Aristotle, and of make an exception. These fire, according to others four elements themselves are composed of matter and form, of substance and accidental qualities, such as warmth and cold, state of motion and of rest, and so forth. Consequently the universe, being a combination of many forces, must have a creative power as

—

—

448

cause. Nor can the existence of the world be due mere chance. Where there is purpose manifested, there must have been wisdom at work. Ink spilled accidentally upon a sheet of paper can not produce its

to

legible writing.

Bahya then proceeds, following chiefly Saadia and the Motekallamin (teachers of the Kalain), to prove the unity of God by showing: (1) All Unity classes, causes, and principles of things of God.

lead back to one principal cause. (2) of all things in nature, the interdependence of all creatures, the wondrous plan and wisdom displayed in the structure of the

The harmony

and smallest of animal beings, from the elephant to the ant, all point to one great designer the physico-theological argument of Aristotle. (3) There assumption of more than is no reason for the one creator, since the world manifests but one plan No one woidd without sufand, order everywhere. greatest

—

cause ascribe a letter written altogether in the and handwriting to more than one writer. (4) The assumption of many creators would necessitate either a plurality of identical beings which, having nothing to distinguish them, could not but be one and the same that is, God or of different beings which, having different qualities and lacking some qualities which others possess, can no longer be infinite and perfect, and therefore must themselves be created, not self-existent. (5) Every plurality, being a combination of units, presupposes an original unity hence, even those that assume a plurality of gods must logically admit the prior existence of a Divine Unity a Neoplatonic argument borrowed by Bahya from the Brothers of Purity. (6) The Creator can not share with the creatures accidents and substance. The assumption of a plurality, which is an accident and not a substance, would lower God, the Creator, to the level of creatures. (7) The assumption ficient

same

style

—

—



—

creators would necessitate insufficiency of them or interference of one with the power of the other; and as the limitation deprives the Creator of His power, unity alone establishes Divine

of

two

either of

omnipotence. After having thus proved God's unity, Bahya endeavors to define God as the absolute unity by distinguishing His unity from all other possible unities. There is, he says, a unity that is obviously only accidental, as, for example, that of an army consisting of many soldiers; and there is another unity, the accidental character of which is less visible, as. for instance, that of the body, which consists of matter and form. Contrasting with this, there is the substantial unity presented by the unit which forms the unit and the basis of all numbers. Still this unity exists only as an idea. But there is a substantial unity which exists as the reality of all truth. Not subject to any change or accident, it is the root of all things, and has no similarity to any other thing. This real unity, necessitated by the plurality of all things as their root and eternal cause, is God.

Every other unity of things

is

accidental, since

com-

alone is the true unity; nothing exists beside Him that is absolutely and eternally one. Adopting this Neoplatonic idea of God as the one who can only be felt by the longing soul, but not grasped by the reason, Bahya finds it superfluous to posite;

God