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 On the other hand the failure of the Japanese to cooperate in their own defense or in collective security efforts in east Asia as much as the American public feels to be reasonable could set off an equally dangerous reaction in the United States. The shift from interventionism to isolationism is a small one in those political circles most addicted to extreme stands on either issue. The rapid shift from a demand for the extension of the Korean war into Manchuria to a demand that the South Koreans assume the entire military load indicates how close these two logically opposed views can be. Those political forces in the United States which are most likely to demand an intolerable rate of rearmament for the Japanese are also the most likely to advocate the complete abandonment of American assistance in Japanese defense if their first demands are not met. While traditionally both parties in the United States have been more willing to support an active policy in Asia than in Europe, there are definite signs that this attitude is changing; the greater difficulties of the American position in Asia are perhaps beginning to make isolationist sentiment redirect itself from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

In the economic field there are fewer immediate differences of opinion between the United States and Japan and a clearer recognition on both sides of their mutual interests. There are, however, economic problems which tend to complicate those of defense and certain areas of potential disagreement which in time could grow to dangerous proportions.

One issue of possible future dispute is the continuance of American aid to Japan, if it proves necessary to support her or help pay for whatever degree of rearmament the United States demands. At present America is providing economic support to Japan through mutually beneficial military procurement occasioned by the Korean war. But this arrangement is not likely to continue indefinitely, and it could come to an end at a time when the United States is unwilling to supply any other economic assistance, owing either to domestic politics or to popular American dissatisfaction with Japan's defense role. Somewhat the same situation faces the United States in western Europe, where American aid and local defense measures are delicately balanced against each other, but the problem is likely to become more acute in Japan because her economic position is fundamentally more desperate than that of western Europe, and the people are less prepared psychologically to contribute to their own defense.

An even more basic problem is whether or not Japan can maintain a viable economy, even with American aid. This is fundamentally a problem of cheap sources of essential raw materials and adequate markets for both visible and invisible exports. The United States no longer figures prominently as a direct market for Japanese goods. With the end of the great American demand for silk, Japan lost its one major item of export to the United States. Obviously American restrictive tariffs decidedly reduce the flow of Japanese goods to this country. The Japanese, like our allies in Europe, resent this but realize that even a radical shift in American tariff policies would not aid Japan much.

A more crucial area for Japan's economy than exports to the United States is services, particularly shipping. It does not seem probable that Japan's economy can survive unless Japanese bottoms again carry the bulk of Japan's imports and exports and at the same time contribute substantially to Japan's