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 defense measures it now criticizes. But the split on this issue in Japanese domestic politics during the next few years may well become wider.

The rise in strength of the two Socialist factions in the recent elections was marked, but was still so far from producing a Socialist Government as to indicate that an important shift in public sympathies will be necessary before the Socialists can win a parliamentary majority. Such a shift is perhaps more likely to come over economic issues than over defense policies, but it could well come in such form as to influence the latter decisively. Many, if not most, Japanese feel that the United States is inevitably involved in all political issues in Japan. They assume, either with satisfaction or with resentment, that American economic and military cooperation is obtainable only by an essentially conservative Government in Japan. This argument is not used blatantly by the Liberals but nevertheless contributes decidedly to their present dominance. This, in turn, naturally tends to give a definitely anti-American flavor to opposition to the Government on any score. Such sentiment might so solidify as to commit the opposition in Japan to a policy of noncooperation, if not open conflict, with the United States. Present political trends in Japan, thus, suggest the definite possibility that a future change of Government based largely on public desire for a reversal of domestic economic policies might entail a complete re-orientation of Japan's foreign policy and the abandonment of the present course of cooperation with the United States for a hazardous experiment in unprotected neutrality.

Postwar policies in Japan have so far not become political issues in the United States, but it is perfectly possible that they might within the near future, perhaps with disastrous results. There is considerable political dynamite lying dormant in our position in Japan which has not been exploited in domestic American politics simply because of the accidental relationship of the opposition party to General Douglas MacArthur and subsequently to Mr. John Foster Dulles. This deterrent, however, may not remain valid in the future. Some day politicians may find it convenient to point to the seeming inconsistency of American policy in so disarming Japan and reforming her economy after the war that now we must protect and support her. There is actually more material for a possibly effective, though specious, attack on administration policy on the score of "pro-Communist activities" and "socialism" in our postwar record in Japan than in our relations with China, and, if these materials are ever made use of for partisan political ends, the repercussions on American-Japanese relations could be very serious.

Even without the eruption of a political battle over past policies in Japan, there is danger that any American administration, either on its own volition or under public pressure, might embark on a course of action which would disrupt Japanese-American cooperation. This could happen most easily because of American insistence on a rate of rearmament in Japan and a degree of participation in extra-Japanese defense problems which the Japanese are neither economically able nor psychologically prepared to support. Any marked decline in Japanese living standards attributable to military costs would probably produce a strong political reaction in Japan against further cooperation with the United States. Even widespread disappointment over the slowness of economic or political progress might easily be blamed on the burden of defense efforts and produce the same unfortunate political results.