Page:Jackson v. State, 2013 Ark. 201, 427 S.W.3d 607.pdf/30

 potential evidence of criminality. ''Cf. Dowty v. State'', 363 Ark. 1, 13, 210 S.W.3d 850 (2005) (officer asserted that drug dealers routinely use rental cars to avoid seizure of their personal vehicles upon arrest).

Were these the universe of Trooper Behnke's justification for initiating the warrantless search, then in conducting our de novo review for probable cause, I would deem the search unconstitutional. See Lilly v. State, 362 Ark. 436, 442–44, 208 S.W.3d 785 (2005). But those did not comprise Trooper Behnke's full menu of criminal "indicators." In addition to pointing to the occupants' demeanor and delayed answers to questions, Trooper Behnke relied upon the drug sniff that K-9 Major undertook beginning roughly 15 minutes 44 seconds after he had stopped the pickup.

It is here that our duty to give deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts must take center stage. For the circuit court's decision that the Trooper truly was still waiting for a return of the criminal history check from ACIC is pivotal. While the record on that point is not crystal clear, such a factual determination requires our deference. As such, I cannot say that I have a definite and firm conviction that the circuit court made a mistake.

Accordingly, I agree that the deployment of K-9 Major took place during the course of the initial stop. If K-9 Major was "reliable" and if Trooper Behnke had adequate basis to conclude that he indeed had alerted, then Trooper Behnke had probable cause to conduct the subsequent warrantless search. The majority found no basis to conclude that the circuit court was clearly erroneous in reaching these findings of historical fact. And based on the record before us, I must agree.