Page:Jackson v. State, 2013 Ark. 201, 427 S.W.3d 607.pdf/26

 undisputed fact patterns. In general, it is the trial judges who sit in a far better position than we to evaluate the testimony because "they are there"; we are not. For that reason, we must indulge a healthy dose of deference to the circuit court's superior position to determine the credibility of the witnesses at suppression hearings and the weight to be accorded to their testimony. Cockrell v. State, 2010 Ark. 258, at 10, 370 S.W.3d 197; Flanagan v. State, 368 Ark. 143, 154, 243 S.W.3d 866 (2006). In a related vein, we must give due deference to the circuit court's findings of historical facts – for example, what events led up to the stop or search, what statements were (or were not) made during the course of the seizure, whether the detainee was Mirandized or, as in the case at bar, whether a dog handler reasonably inferred that his dog actually alerted to illegal drugs. Accordingly, the circuit court's findings of historical facts may not be overturned unless the appellate court, after review of the entire evidence, is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. E.g., Lee v. State, 2009 Ark. 255, at 4, 308 S.W.3d 596.

Yet such deference evaporates when assessing whether the facts give rise to a determination of reasonable suspicion or probable cause. As the United States Supreme Court pointed out in Ornelas, "as a general matter determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal." 517 U.S. at 699. That is because such determinations ultimately involve mixed questions of law and fact. Only by exercising de novo review can appellate courts appropriately unify precedent which, in turn, can enable law enforcement officers to make better and more-informed decisions in the field. See id. at 697–98; United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 275 (2002). Thus, it is up to the appellate court to reach the legal conclusion whether, under the totality of the circumstances and