Page:Jackson v. State, 2013 Ark. 201, 427 S.W.3d 607.pdf/17

 of the unwarned statement in the case in chief. No further purpose is served by imputing "taint" to subsequent statements obtained pursuant to a voluntary and knowing waiver.

470 U.S. at 318. In this case, we cannot say that the circuit court erred in finding the custodial statement to be admissible when it was made after Miranda warnings that were clearly effective, as Jackson invoked his right to remain silent.

Affirmed; Court of Appeals' opinion vacated.

H, C.J., and B, H, JJ., and Special Justice G T. J concur.

H, J., not participating. 

 J H, Chief Justice, concurring. I concur that the circuit court's decision denying Jackson's motion to suppress should be affirmed. However, I write separately to state how I reached that conclusion.

As the majority states, Jackson presents three issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was seized in the course of an illegal detention, (2) whether the warrantless search of his vehicle was reasonable, and (3) whether the custodial statement violated his Miranda rights and the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine.

As the majority notes, Jackson does not challenge the legality of the traffic stop that Corporal Behnke testified was for an "[i]mproper lane change, cutting in front of a tractor trailer, and following too close." The issue is whether Corporal Behnke unlawfully detained Jackson. Once the legitimate purpose of a valid traffic stop is over, to detain a person, a law-enforcement officer must have reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is about to