Page:Jackson v. State, 2013 Ark. 201, 427 S.W.3d 607.pdf/16

 tree was rejected. That denial was reversed on appeal by the Oregon Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. In ruling that the subsequent statement was admissible and was not impermissibly tainted by the previous statement, the Court reasoned:

"If errors are made by law enforcement officers in administering the prophylactic Miranda procedures, they should not breed the same irremediable consequences as police infringement of the Fifth Amendment itself. It is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold that a simple failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise his free will, so taints the investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period. Though Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made."

Id. at 309.

Here, after being advised of his Miranda rights, Jackson stated that he would not answer any questions because "[t]here's nothing for [him] to say because [the police] already [had his] weed." There was no evidence that Corporal Behnke's initial failure to advise Jackson of his Miranda rights on the roadside was purposeful or part of an interrogation-first tactic, such that his custodial statement should be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. There is simply no merit to Jackson's contention that the coercive nature of events surrounding the first statement requires suppression of the second statement. As the Supreme Court stated in Elstad,

The relevant inquiry is whether, in fact, the second statement was also voluntarily made. As in any such inquiry, the finder of fact must examine the surrounding circumstances and the entire course of police conduct with respect to the suspect in evaluating the voluntariness of his statements. The fact that a suspect chooses to speak after being informed of his rights is, of course, highly probative. We find that the dictates of Miranda and the goals of the Fifth Amendment proscription against use of compelled testimony are fully satisfied in the circumstances of this case by barring use