Page:Jackson v. State, 2013 Ark. 201, 427 S.W.3d 607.pdf/15

 statements, finding that the "question-first tactic effectively threatens to thwart Miranda&#39;s purpose of reducing the risk that a coerced confession would be admitted." Id. at 617. In so doing, the Court concluded that in such circumstances a midstream recitation of warnings after an interrogation and an unwarned confession rendered the Miranda warnings ineffective. Id. at 604. More specifically, as explained by the Supreme Court, "[t]hese circumstances must be seen as challenging the comprehensibility and efficacy of the Miranda warnings to the point that a reasonable person in the suspect's shoes would not have understood them to convey a message that she retained a choice about continuing to talk." Id. at 617 (footnote omitted).

While Jackson relies on the decision in Seibert to support his argument that the custodial statement should be suppressed, the facts as presented here are clearly distinguishable from those in Seibert. And, in fact, are more akin to those presented in the Supreme Court decision of Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985). There the court was confronted with the issue of whether an initial failure by law-enforcement officers to administer Miranda warnings, without more, tainted subsequent admissions after a suspect had been advised and then waived his Miranda rights. In that case, an officer, in speaking to the appellant who was suspected in a burglary, told the appellant that he believed he was involved in the burglary, to which the appellant replied, "Yes, I was there." Id. at 301. The appellant had not been advised of his Miranda rights at that time. He was then transported to a sheriff's office, where he was advised of his Miranda rights, which he then waived, giving a full statement implicating himself in the burglary. The appellant's motion to suppress his custodial statement as fruit of the poisonous