Page:JT International SA v Commonwealth of Australia.pdf/50

Gummow J

experience of the Supreme Court of the United States was frankly stated in Penn Central Transportation Co v New York City :


 * '… this Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any "set formula" for determining when "justice and fairness" require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.'"

Brennan J continued:

"In this Court, the limitation in par (xxxi) has not been thought hitherto to apply to a regulatory law that did not effect an acquisition of property. In Tooth's Case, the distinction between a law that provides for an acquisition of property and a law that does not was clearly drawn." His Honour then repeated the passage from the reasons of Mason J in Tooth which has been set out above.

Also in the Tasmanian Dam Case, Mason J, in a passage later approved by Dawson J , said:

"The emphasis in s 51(xxxi) is not on a 'taking' of private property but on the acquisition of property for purposes of the Commonwealth. To bring the constitutional provision into play it is not enough that legislation adversely affects or terminates a pre-existing right that an owner enjoys in relation to his property; there must be an acquisition whereby the Commonwealth or another acquires an interest in property, however slight or insubstantial it may be." (emphasis in original)

Whether the law in question sufficiently impairs the group of rights inhering in the property in question as to amount to an involuntary taking of that property, presents questions of substance and degree, rather than merely of form. That this is so is well settled by authority beginning at least with the reasons of Dixon J in Bank of New South Wales v The Commonwealth ("the Banking