Page:Ivan the Terrible - Kazimierz Waliszewski - tr. Mary Loyd (1904).djvu/338

 314 Ivan realized he must lower his tone to Poland. He sent one courier after another to Warsaw, and appeared disposed, at last, to take the initiative, in order to prevent a second campaign, if Batory really intended to undertake another. His couriers were actually told they need not remonstrate if the King did not stand up when he inquired after the Tsar's health! Batory gave the messengers of peace a friendly reception, but continued to hurry forward his preparations. When June came, he gave the Tsar five weeks in which to send him an embassy; otherwise, he said, 'he would mount his horse'; and Ivan, 'noting his neighbour's condescension in satisfying his demands,' as he put it in his instructions, despatched the embassy forthwith. Before it had got halfway, with its huge suite of 500 persons, its leaders learnt there was nothing more for them to do at Warsaw. The King of Poland had 'mounted his horse,' and, followed by his troops, had just started forth from Vilna.

The capture of Polotsk had made no real breach in the Muscovite Empire. That was a mere taking back of what had once been a Polish possession. It was only now that Batory and his army were really to plunge into the heart of the enemy's country. In the Polish camp opinion was divided, as it had been at the opening of the previous campaign. Some wanted to march from Czasniki, the new point of concentration, half-way between Smolensk and Viélikié-Louki, straight on Smolensk, while others desired to move on Pskov. Batory decided to strike at Viélikié-Louki, a fortress standing in the midst of a rich and populous country, used by the Russians as a storehouse for their war material, and the usual base of their operations against Lithuania.

The invading army, reinforced by the infantry recruited on the royal properties, the organization of which had been somewhat delayed, was a little stronger, numerically speaking, than it had been in the previous year. Its effective strength now amounted to about 17,500 men, 8,321 of whom were Polish or Hungarian infantry, and a Lithuanian contingent which may be reckoned at about 10,000 men. The march to Viélikié-Louki was a severe one. To avoid crossing the Dvina under the guns of Viélije, another fortress in the same region, the Poles cut their way through thick forests, and split up their forces to such an extent that one corps of 6,000 men completely lost contact with the main body of the troops. The foolhardiness of this operation has been criticised, but its boldness would seem justified by the remoteness of the Muscovite