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Rh, 21 Wall. 162; the WatsonWilson [sic] case, 114 U. S. 422, and in the Moore case, 91 U. S. 274, &c.

"The interpretation of the Constitution * * * is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed in the language of the English Common Law, and are to be read in the light of its history." Smith vs. Alabama, 124 U. S. 478.

Why these unerring methods have not been heretofore fully applied is a strange enigma of this subject, especially as it is believed that they inevitably lead to correct solution of all the questions that have arisen or that may arise. It is passing strange that the meaning and genesis of the Sixteenth Amendment should have been sought, whilst those of the two provisions of the Constitution, in part amended by it have so far as ascertained, been no part of the inquiry.

But before making these essential inquiries, directed by the Supreme Court, a matter leading to much confusion of thought should first be disposed of. By some it has been earnestly contended that all amendments must be liberally interpreted. But it is believed, that there is no ground for such contention. Of course, on a very general principle, statutes are naturally to be construed if possible to be effective, not ineffective, and, therefore, where a power is constitutionally granted, the implied powers necessary to make the grant effective go with it. But that has nothing to do with the question as to what power has actually been granted. If a power be given to tax beans, that which is necessary to tax beans is certainly granted. No one denies that. But this does not, in the slightest degree, create a right to tax peas, though there be similarities, nor any implied powers necessary to do so. The rules of construction as to acts that, in effect, penalize or