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 CHAPTER 3

THE CURRENT POSITION: 1998–2002


 * 1) This chapter sets out what we know of Saddam Hussein’s chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, drawing on all the available evidence. While it takes account of the results from UN inspections and other publicly available information, it also draws heavily on the latest intelligence about Iraqi efforts to develop their programmes and capabilities since 1998. The main conclusions are that:
 * 2) *Iraq has a useable chemical and biological weapons capability, in breach of UNSCR 687, which has included recent production of chemical and  biological agents;
 * 3) *Saddam continues to attach great importance to the possession of weapons   of mass destruction and ballistic missiles which he regards as being the basis   for Iraq’s regional power. He is determined to retain these capabilities;
 * 4) *Iraq can deliver chemical and biological agents using an extensive range of   artillery shells, free-fall bombs, sprayers and ballistic missiles;
 * 5) *Iraq continues to work on developing nuclear weapons, in breach of its   obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and in breach of UNSCR   687. Uranium has been sought from Africa that has no civil nuclear  application in Iraq;
 * 6) *Iraq possesses extended-range versions of the SCUD ballistic missile in   breach of UNSCR 687 which are capable of reaching Cyprus, Eastern   Turkey, Tehran and Israel. It is also developing longer-range ballistic  missiles;
 * 7) *Iraq’s current military planning specifically envisages the use of chemical     and biological weapons;
 * 8) *Iraq’s military forces are able to use chemical and biological weapons, with     command, control and logistical arrangements in place. The Iraqi military are     able to deploy these weapons within 45 minutes of a decision to do so;
 * 9) *Iraq has learnt lessons from previous UN weapons inspections and is already   taking steps to conceal and disperse sensitive equipment and documentation   in advance of the return of inspectors;
 * 10) *Iraq’s chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missiles programmes are     well-funded.

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) Assessment: 1999–2002 Since the withdrawal of the inspectors the JIC has monitored evidence, including from secret intelligence, of continuing work on Iraqi offensive chemical and biological warfare capabilities. In the first half of 2000 the JIC noted  Rh