Page:Iran Air Flight 655 investigation.djvu/82

 4.(U) The ongoing surface engagement was a significant factor in increasing tension within USS VINCENNES's CIC.

5.(U) The foul bore and resulting high speed maneuvering of the ship to keep MT 52 in position to engage IRGC craft were complicating factors which prevented the CO from devoting his full attention to TN 4131, and it contributed to the tension in the CIC of USS VINCENNES.

6.(U) The surface engagements conducted by USS VINCENNES and USS MONTGOMERY was effective.

E. 1. SSES probably made the initial alert of an F-14 coincident with the recognition of TN 4131 by CIC. However, even if SSES did not make this identification, CIC personnel believed SSES did, providing TN 4131 with positive (though inaccurate) identification

2.(U) At no time did IR 655 actually descend in altitude prior to engagement.

3.(U) Iran Air Flight 655, an Airbus 300, was on a normal climb out from Bandar Abbas and was flying within the established air route, A-59, from Bandar Abbas to Dubai.

4.(U) IR 655 was not on the exact center of airway A-59, but was 3.37 NM west of the centerline. However, it was in the assigned airway.

5.(U) Iran Air Flight 655 was not squawking Mode II-1100, but squawked Mode III-6760 during the entire flight.

U 6. The IDS mis-correlated an RCI readout of Mode II-1100 with TN 4131. This occurred, according to analysis of the data, when the IDS hooked TN 4131 as it departed Bandar Abbas and left it hooked for almost 90 seconds. This meant that as the hooked symbol moved toward USS VINCENNES the read-gate for the RCI remained near Bandar Abbas. A Mode II transmission from an aircraft on the ground in Bandar Abbas would then be displayed in his RCI if the signal could get to the ship.

U 7. The un-correlated IFF Mode II-1100 obtained by IDS could have been generated by a military aircraft (C-130, F-4, F-14) located on the ground at Bandar Abbas. This was supported by his IDS' RCI set-up and the RF ducting condition in effect on 3 July. Therefore, any number of military aircraft, present at the airfield, could have responded to a Mode II IFF interrogation