Page:Iran Air Flight 655 investigation.djvu/81

 B. 1.(U) CJTFME and CO, USS VINCENNES, properly selected and applied the correct Rules of Engagement to both the surface and air engagements.

2.(U) Based upon the information presented to Captain Rogers, engagement of TN 4131 was within the parameters of the Rules of Engagement.

C. 1.Training and Readiness/Battle Doctrine.

a. (U) The USS VINCENNES was adequately trained to perform her missions as a unit of JTFME.

b. (U) With the exception of the AAWC position, USS VINCENNES' General Quarters AAW watch organization was experienced and qualified.

c. (U) Ship's Battle Doctrine was sound.

2.CIC Watch Organization.

a. (U) "GW" was considered by CO USS VINCENNES as his primary force ship air warfare advisor.

b. (U) The Persian Gulf modifications to the USS VINCENNES's CIC organization moved the ship's AAW coordination function away from AAWC and left him acting largely as a console operator. Assignment of "GW" to Force AAW, Ship AAW, and MEF execution net talker for surface and air SITREPS degraded his ability to independently assess the actual profile and ID of TN 4131.

3.Material/Combat Systems Readiness.

(U) There were no AEGIS combat systems maintenance or materiel problems which contributed to the incident.

D. 1.(U) OCEAN LORD 25 took hostile fire from one of the groups of IRGC small boats it had been monitoring.

2.(U) The group of boats which USS VINCENNES took under fire included the group which had fired at OCEAN LORD 25.

3.(U) USS MONTGOMERY and USS VINCENNES were fired upon by IRGC gun boats during the course of the surface engagement.