Page:Iran Air Flight 655 investigation.djvu/79

 including the evaluation of individual CIC console operator actions.

U 9. The Commanding Officer VINCENNES decision to engage TN 4131 was based primarily on the following:

(a) (U) The aircraft had lifted off from an airfield used jointly by military and civilian aircraft in Iran heading directly toward his ship at a relatively low altitude.

(b) (U) Track 4131 was CBDR to USS VINCENNES and USS MONTGOMERY.

(c) (U) TN 4131 was flying at a reported altitude which was lower than USS VINCENNES observed COMAIR to fly previously. Additionally, it was not flying exactly on the airway centerline as USS VINCENNES had seen previous COMAIR consistently do.

(d) (U) It appeared to veer toward the USS MONTGOMERY.

(e) (U) Track 4131 was reported to be increasing in speed, decreasing in altitude, and closing range.

U (f) No ESM was reflected from track 4131, however, F-14s can fly "cold-nose" for delivery of weapons (no emitters).

(g) (U) The aircraft was not responding to verbal warnings over IAD or MAD.

U (h) Track 4131 was reported by USS VINCENNES personnel to be squawking Mode II-1100 which historically correlated to Iranian F-14's.

(i) (U) The aircraft appeared to be maneuvering into an attack position.

(j) (U) Visual identification of the aircraft was not feasible due to the lack of combat air patrol.

U (k) Iranian fighter aircraft had flown coincident with the surface hostilities involving U.S. and Iranian Forces on 18 April 1988.

U (l) Warnings had been issued for increased hostile activity for the 48 hour period which included the July 4th weekend.

U (m) An Iranian P-3 airborne to the west of USS VINCENNES, turned inbound and was tracking in a classic targeting mode.

(n) (U) The Stark incident.