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A.

1.(U) The USS VINCENNES did not purposely shoot down an Iranian commercial airliner. Rather, it engaged an aircraft the Commanding Officer, USS VINCENNES reasonably believed to be hostile and a threat to his ship and to the USS MONTGOMERY (FF 1082).

2.(U) Based on the information available to and used by the CO in making his decision, the short time frame available to him in which to make his decision, and his personal belief that his ship and the USS MONTGOMERY were being threatened, he acted in a prudent manner.

3.(U) Iran must share the responsibility for the tragedy by hazarding one of their civilian airliners by allowing it to fly a relatively low altitude air route in Close proximity to hostilities that had been ongoing, and where IRGC boats were actively engaged in armed conflict with U.S. Naval vessels.

4.(U) The downing of Iran Air 655 was not the result of any negligent or culpable conduct by any U.S. Naval personnel associated with the incident.

5.(U) Based on the information available to CJTFME, his confidence in CAPT Rogers and the' capabilities of USS VINCENNES, his concurrence to engage TN 4131 was correct.

6.(U) The AEGIS Combat System's performance was excellent -- it functioned as designed. Had the CO USS VINCENNES used the information generated by his C&D system as the sole source of his tactical information, the CO might not have engaged TN 4131.

7.(U) Time compression played a significant role in the incident. From the time the CO first became aware of TN 4131 as a possible threat, until he made his decision to engage, the elapsed time was approximately three minutes, 40 seconds. Additionally, the Commanding Officer's attention which Was devoted to the ongoing surface engagement against IRGC forces (the "wolf closest to the sled"), left very little time for him to personally verify information provided to him by his CIC team--a team in which he had great confidence. The fog of war and those human elements which affect each individual differently--not the least of which was the thought of the Stark incident--are factors that must be considered.

8.(U) The digital data extracted from USS VINCENNES data recording tapes is valid and provided invaluable insights and information for the reconstruction of the events of 3 July 1988