Page:Iran Air Flight 655 investigation.djvu/76

 U (15) Pk of on board defensive missile systems diminishes inside 10 NM. (Rogers, pp. 838-839).

U (16) Visual identification of the aircraft was not feasible. (Rogers, p. 839).

U c.  recalled the following additional indicators which he useused [sic] in assessing the threat posed by TN 4131.

U (1) The aircraft had lifted off from a military airfield in Iran heading south. (, p. 812).

U (2) The aircraft appeared to veer toward USS MONTGOMERY after CAPT Rogers ordered that the target be illuminated. (, p. 814).

U (3) The aircraft's lift off from Bandar Abbas was observed to be in a pattern that did not match previous COMAIR flights. (, p. 812).

U (4) Track 4131 was reported as an F-14. (, p. 812).

U (5) SSES provides no information to negate the reported assertion that track 4131 was an F-14. (, p. 813).

U (6) P-3 turned inbound and was tracking in the classic targeting profile. ( p. 814).

U d. CJTFME considered the following indicators under the ROE when concurring in USS VINCENNES decision to engage track 4131:

U (1) The aircraft had been identified by USS VINCENNES as an F-14.

U (2) USS VINCENNES indicated that the aircraft was inbound on USS VINCENNES.

U (3) USS VINCENNES was told to warn the aircraft. ( p. 426; p.886).

D.

1.

U a. The IRGC boats which were involved in the gun fight with VINCENNES/MONTGOMERY departed the area toward the wreckage in the very early 0700Z hour. (IO 232, recap of events)