Page:Iran Air Flight 655 investigation.djvu/75

 U b. CAPT Rogers recalled having the following indicators in declaring track 4131 hostile and deciding to engage:

U (1) F-14s had been recently moved to Bandar (Rogers, p. 835).

U (2) Iranian fighters had flown coincident with surface engagement on 18 April 1988. (Rogers, p. 839).

U (3) The aircraft was not responding to verbal warnings over IAD or MAD. (Rogers, pp. 838, 846).

U (4) There had been warnings of an increased threat over the July 4th weekend. (Rogers, p. 835).

U (5) Increased hostile activity had been predicted for the 48 hours following recent Iraqi military victory. (Rogers, p. 835).

U (6) The aircraft was not following the air corridor in the same manner as other commercial aircraft had been seen consistently to behave (i.e. flying exactly on the centerline). (Rogers, p. 850).

U (7) It was flying at a reported altitude which was lower than COMAIR were observed to fly in the past. (Rogers, pp. 847, 850).

U (8) Track 4131 was reported to be increasing in speed. (Rogers, p. 838).

U (9) Track 4131 was reported to be decreasing in altitude. (Rogers, p. 838).

U (10) Track 4131 was CBDR to USS VINCENNES and USS MONTGOMERY. (Rogers, p. 837).

U (11) Track 4131 was reported by USS VINCENNES's personnel squawking Mode II-1100 which correlates with an F-14. (Rogers, p. 837).

U (12) No ESM was reflected from track 4131, however, F-14s can fly "cold-nose" (no emitters). (Rogers, p. 838).

U (13) F-14s have an air-to-surface capability with Maverick and modified Eagle missiles. (IO Exhibits 9 & 10).

U (14) The aircraft appeared to be maneuvering into an attack position. (Rogers, p. 838).