Page:Iran Air Flight 655 investigation.djvu/56

 U (7) Experience with small boat tactics shows that the greatest threat they present is personnel and equipment casualties when they make high speed massed attacks on their targets, raking the superstructures of ships with gunfire and rockets. (Rogers p. 841)

U (8) The small boats did not turn away after the USS VINCENNES fired its first round, but continued to close. (Rogers p. 837).

U hh. CJTFME considered the following ROE cumulative indicators in, granting permission to engage the small boats:

U (1) Positive identification of the boats as those having committed a hostile act against a U.S. ship.

U (2) The small boats were not leaving the area.

U (3) The small boats were closing the USS VINCENNES and USS MONTGOMERY.{(redact|4|foia-exceptions=(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)}} p. 856.,  p. 425)

U ii. USS MONTGOMERY and USS VINCENNES disengaged from the small boats when they ceased presenting a threat to U.S. ships. ( p.51, p. 518, Rogers p. 839)

C.

a. (U) USS VINCENNES's magnetic tapes containing data extracted from her SPY-1A, Command and Decision, and Weapons Control System computers, were transferred by courier from USS VINCENNES to Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren (NSWC) on 5 July 1988. p. 280)

b. (U) NSWC Dahlgren signed a receipt for the tapes on 6 July 1988 ( p. 281)

c. (U) NSWC Dahlgren copied the tapes and performed data reduction on the USS VINCENNES's tapes IAW standard procedures.

d. (U) The results of that data reduction are included as IO Exhibits 81-105. (, pp. 279-371)

e. (U) Preliminary data extraction results were provided by CO NAVSWC DAHLGREN messages 080516Z JUL 88 and 090708Z JUL 88. The former message stated: "Data received and successfully duplicated with the exception of less than 1% of one non-critical WCS tape. Initial basic analysis runs complete and checked. This report based on excellent SPY-1A data and correlations between SPY-1A, C&D, and WCS." (IO Exhibit 91).