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 ASW 1 and 2; SAG "A"; LAMPS Secure. Military Air Distress (MAD) was also recorded on a portable tape recorder. (IO Exhibit 203).

(2) (U) USS VINCENNES's primary radio telephone talker for MEF Execution was the FAAWC "GW". He was directly responsible for relaying both the surface and air tactical picture, as seen on USS VINCENNES, along with the force air picture, as seen on USS SIDES and USS ELMER MONTGOMERY, to "GB". (, p. 809,, p. 788).

(3) (U) USS VINCENNES internal net 15 is designated for warfare coordinators, only, i.e. CO, TAO, OOD, SSWC, CSC, TIC, SSES. (IO Exhibit 160).

(4) (U) On 3 July 1988, the following CIC operators were using net 15 or 16 in addition to warfare coordinators: FWC, IDS, EWS, RSC, SITREP Officer at ECDA, EWS, EWCO and various other stations that had "punched" into the net. (IO Exhibit 160, pp. 1-5;, p. 528).

(5) (U) Internal communications had to be shifted between net 15 and 16 due to degradation of the CKT during the 3 July 1988 events. ( p. 528).

(6) (U) Internal net 15/16 was heavily used and difficult to get information across. (, p. 684).

(7) (U) Internal communications procedures, i.e. specific call ups in accordance with standard procedures, were known by operators but not always used. (, p. 567).

e. Combat Systems Doctrine

(1)   (IO Exhibit 160, 176;, p.528).

(2)  IFF Interrogate Doctrine – IFF Doctrine activated on 3 July 1988 showed that all SPY-1 surface and air tracks from 5NM to  were being interrogated on IFF modes I, II, III/A and C at one minute intervals. (IO Exhibits 91, 176).

(3)  ID Doctrine – 23 HIFASTTHR will ID air tracks currently ID "unknown pending" or "unknown evaluated", at ranges of 30 to  miles, altitudes 55,000 to  feet and speeds of 1150 to 2200 knots, as assumed enemy. The data