Page:Iran Air Flight 655 investigation.djvu/32

 U (1)  In the week preceding the USS VINCENNES incident the Iraqi Air Force stepped up its attacks on Iranian oil facilities and shuttle convoys in the Northern Persian Gulf (NPG). Iranian reaction to these successful Iraqi attacks was anticipated by CJTFME and they warned the Middle East Force, including USS VINCENNES, on 2 July 1988. (IO Exhibit 14, Intelligence Background Briefing). U (2)  USS VINCENNES was apprised of the general Iranian situation on 30 June and 1 July, specifically that because Iraq had extended its successes in the ground war to the NPG with a renewed air campaign against Iranian shipping and oil facilities, Iranian reaction should be expected. "...in the meantime, anticipate IRGC ship attacks in retaliation for Iraqi Air Force attacks on Iranian shuttle tankers." (IO Exhibit 14, CJTFME//J2//0212900Z July 1988). U (3)  The significant Air Order of Battle at Bandar Abbas as of 3 July 1988 was: at least 1 F-14, approximately 6 operational F-4’s, and 1 C-130. (IO Exhibit 14, Intelligence background Brief). U (4)  The F-14 flights from Bandar Abbas during this period were:

25 June — patrol (0500-0600Z)

26 June — patrol (1300-1400Z)

27 June — patrol (0500-0700Z)

28 June — patrol (1300-1400Z)

29 June — patrol (0700-0900Z)

30 June — patrol (0500-0600Z)

1 July — patrol (0700-0900Z)

2 July — patrol (0700-0900Z)

(IO Exhibit 14, Iranian Air Force Activity from Bandar Abbas).

f. Activity on 2 July, 1988 — The Maersk Attack U (1)  At 021600Z the Danish ship, KARMA MAERSK, outbound from Saudi Arabia, was repeatedly, though unsuccessfully, attacked by IRGC small boats staging out of Abu Musa Island at a point 20NM SW of that island. (IO Exhibit 14, Intelligence Background Brief).