Page:Iran Air Flight 655 investigation.djvu/15

 the small boats and he could count on the advice of to keep him informed, and should the circumstance arise the AAW capabilities of USS VINCENNES were such that he could execute a timely and successful engagement.

(6) (U) In hindsight it appears that the replacement of as the AAWC with, an inexperienced officer, qualified only through on the job training, contributed to a degradation of the AAWC organization under combat stress. This in effect denied a double check on the information being provided from the ship's "Air Alley." Based on previous training and drills, however, Captain Rogers could not have reasonably foreseen this as a consequence of a sound tactical decision to modify his ship's battle doctrine for operations in the Persian Gulf.

f. (U) The performance of leaves room for question. He was the one officer upon whom Captain Rogers had placed his trust and confidence to evaluate the AAWC situation and provide accurate assessments and recommendations upon which to base an engagement decision.

(1) (U) Early on appears to have arrived at the conclusion that TN 4131 was an F-14 and posed a hostile threat to his ship. He accepted without question the combined reports of the TIC, and the IDS,  as confirming an F-14. He admits his judgement was influenced by the July 4th intelligence warning, recent F-14 deployment to Bandar Abbas, previous observations of an Iranian F-14 squawking Mode II-1100, the Iranian P-3 to the northwest as a possible targeting platform, and the ongoing surface engagement.

(2) (U) In the final minute and forty seconds, tells his Captain, as a fact, that the aircraft has veered from the flight path into an attack profile, and is rapidly descending at increasing speed directly toward USS VINCENNES. Even though the tone of these reports must have seemed increasingly hysterical (yelling and shouting), made no attempt to confirm the reports on his own. Quick reference to the CRO on the console directly in front of him would have immediately shown increasing not decreasing altitude. Rather, this experienced and highly qualified officer, despite all of his training, relied on the judgement of one or two second class petty officers, buttressed by his own preconceived perception of the threat, to make an erroneous assessment to his Commanding Officer. As he said, "I had no reason to doubt them. I had to make a split second recommendation to the Commanding Officer, and I did." While many factors played in Captain Rogers' final decision to engage, the last report by that the aircraft was rapidly descending directly toward the ship may have been pivotal.