Page:Iran Air Flight 655 investigation.djvu/144

 (g) The aircraft was not responding to verbal warnings over IAD or MAD.

(h) Track 4131 waas reported by USS VINCENNES personnel to be squawking Mode II-1100 which historically correlated to Iranian F-14's.

(i) The aircraft appeared to be maneuvering into an attack position.

(j) Visual identification of the aircraft was not feasible due to the lack of combat air patrol.

(k) Iranian fighter aircraft had flown coincident with the surface hostilities involving U.S. and Iranian Forces on 18 April 1988.

(l) Warnings had been issued for increased hostile activity for the 48 hour period which included the July 4th weekend.

(m) An Iranian P-3 airborne to the west of USS VINCENNES, turned inbound.

(n) The Stark incident.

(o) Iranian F-14s have an air-to-surface capability with Maverick missiles, iron bombs, and modified Eagle unguided rockets.

(p) TN 4131 could have been a suicide attack.

10. Having other forces under his tactical control (SIDES, MONTGOMERY) intensified the CO USS VINCENNES's feeling of responsibility to defend his task group from hostile action.

11. The information available to CO, USS VINCENNES, upon which he based his decisions, conflicted in some cases with the data available in USS VINCENNES' command and decision (C&D) system. Specifically:

(a) The C&D system contained no Mode II IFF information on TN 4131 yet operators in CIC had used Mode II as a means of declaring TN 4131 an Iranian F-14.

(b) The C&D system showed TN 4131 continuously ascending, while the CO received reports of "descending altitude" immediately prior to enabling the firing key.

12. Psychological factors: As the investigation developed, and it was discovered that there were disparities between the C&D tape data and what various members of CIC believed they saw, the