Page:Iran Air Flight 655 investigation.djvu/13

 engagement where they were forgetting about the guy coming in." This assessment by cannot be logically explained in that his battle station's character read out (CRO) would have been showing an exact opposite profile of steadily increasing altitude. Clearly, could not have been reporting from the data displayed on the CRO. The most reasonable explanation is contained in the report by  that his behavior was induced by a combination of physiological fatigue, combat operations, stress and tension which can adversely affect performance and mission execution. As states, "The concept of 'scenario fulfillment' could seem as applying in this case." Since  has no doubt that the aircraft is an Iranian F-14, heading toward the ship, and is not acknowledging repeated warnings, "the mind may reject incongruent data and facilitate misperception which promote internal consistency." mental agitation is reflected in his testimony that he took it upon himself to take "every open spot" he was getting on Circuit 15 to ensure "everyone up in the command decision area was informed, kept aware of what was going on in case they got sidetracked by other events." Toward the end it is reported he was yelling out loud.

(2) (U) acting as the principal Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) advisor to the Commanding Officer, apparently accepted  reports of descending altitude and increasing speed at face value without further evaluation on his part from the CRO at his position and, passed the assessment on to the Captain, which in-turn had a direct bearing on the decision to fire. states he "came to the realization that data to me doesn't mean anything, because I reacted to people that I thought thatI knew that I had operated with that were reliableand when they reported at short range they had a decreasing altitude, increasing speed, I had no reason to doubt them."

e. (U) As to the Commanding Officer's conduct, I support the investigation officer's opinion that Captain Rogers made the correct decision to fire given the facts which he had available to him and the short time to make the decision.

(1) (U) Captain Rogers had temporarily changed his ship's battle doctrine for the Persian Gulf by directing his best officer in AAW to sit in the "Golf Whiskey" (or Forces Anti-Air Warfare) position to the left of him in the Command and Decision area. He relied on this officer, to maintain and direct the anti-air warfare picture, provide him with funneled information from the AAWC and, make recommendations upon which the Captain could make a decision as to employment of the ship's weapon systems. Captain Rogers had the highest confidence in the ability of backed up by the facts that  had served aboard USS VINCENNES for five years, was a fully qualified AAWC, and had participated in training and execution exercises under the "Golf Whiskey"