Page:Iran Air Flight 655 investigation.djvu/12

 : The revised warning as promulgated by CJTFME is adequate.

3.(U) The following additional opinions concerning the more contentious issues in the investigation are offered in order to provide a sharper focus and my thinking on these issues.

a. (U) A major consideration in reviewing the report is the time compression within which the actions described in the investigation took place. Only seven minutes and five seconds elapsed between the time Iran Air Flight 655 was first detected by USS VINCENNES and the decision made to fire the missiles. The Captain of USS VINCENNES was made aware of a possible incoming threat aircraft, some four minutes before the decision to fire. Captain Rogers actual decision window was confined to less than one minute when the suspect aircraft was approaching to within ten miles of the sip.

b. (U) The report substantiates that a Mode II-1100 Identification. Friend or Foe System (IFF) signal was received on USS VINCENNES through the Remote Control Indicator (RCI). This signal was received only once in the first minutes of the Iran 655 flight and never received again. It was not picked up by the ship's SPY-1 Radar System. While the source of this signal cannot be verified, the possibility of emanation through the "ducting" phenomenon from a military aircraft on the ground at Bandar Abbas appears plausible.

c. (U) Although the initial identification of the incoming aircraft as an F-14 is in question, it was clearly identified by the IDS operator,, as "Mode II-1100, breaks as F-14." From that moment on the Anti-Air Warfare Coordinator's (AAWC) organization, most especially the Tactical Information Coordinator (TIC), and the Golf Whiskey (Force Anti-Air Warfare Coordinator, who was, were convinced the incoming aircraft was an F-14, despite the fact that the Mode II IFF signal did not reappear and the ship's SPY-i Radar System only held Mode III 6760.

d. (U) The matter of ascending and descending altitude of Flight 655 deserves special attention as there is a direct contradiction between the data tapes obtained from USS VINCENNES and the situation report submitted by USS VINCENNES to the Commander, Joint Task Force Middle East (JTFME) following the engagement.

(1) (U) The primary source for the reports that the aircraft of interest was rapidly decreasing in altitude, at 1,000 feet per mile, and increasing speed on a course directly toward USS VINCENNES was the TIC,. He apparently interjected these reports on the ship's Command Communication Circuit 15 every time he had the opportunity "to make sure they were staying informed and... [not] getting too sidetracked by the surface