Page:Iran Air Flight 655 investigation.djvu/119

 (4) The CO modified basic Battle Doctrine for PG Ops by placing the SITREP officer at OSDA #1 and International Air Distress (IAD) operator at LSD #1. He also placed the data recorder (CICO) directly behind LSD #2 and #3 to maintain timeline of events. The CICO was in view of all large screens and could see "GW's" CRO.

(5) On 3 Jul 88, USS VINCENNES primary AAW watch organization was as follows:

CO

XO

TAO

OSDA

GW/FAAWC

CIC OFFICER

IAD TALKER

CSC

TIC

IDS

SLQ-32

EWS

MSS

RCS

ARC

AAWC

ACS

(6) USS VINCENNES' enlisted general quarters CIC watchstanders for 3 JUL 1988 were PQS qualified for watches held that day.

(7) The Commanding Officer USS VINCENNES certified all officer watchstanders as qualified; however [] had not completed PQS for AAWC (his 3 July 1988 GQ station).

(8) The Commanding Officer USS VINCENNES stated his confidence level before and subsequent to the incident in [] and [] was the highest it could be. He also stated he had great faith in his "GW" organization and his CIC team's experience.

c. Overall Combat System Status

(1) USS VINCENNES' Preventive Maintenance System (PMS), which covers the AEGIS combat system, was recorded properly and showed no significant discrepancies.

(2) The AEGIS combat system was working exceptionally well on 3 July. No anomalies were noted in data analysis or from operator statements.