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 234.0 mhz UHF. Both Department of State and ICAO report that this NOTAM was transmitted through channels to the Government of Iran.

(18) The current verbal warnings issued by CJTFME units do not clearly identify exactly which aircraft the ship is attempting to contact.

(19) Commercial aircraft normally do not have radar homing and warning (RHAW) equipment. U.S. Navy ships either "locking up" with pulsed fire control or continuous wave radars expect no reaction from a commerical air flight.

(20) For the period of 2 June 1988 to 2 July 1988, analysis of challenges and warnings conducted by CJTFME resulted in the following statistics:

(a) 150 challenges were issued

(b) only two were to COMAIR (1.3%)

(c) 125 were to Iranian military aircraft (83%)

(d) Largest number of challenges issued were by the USS SPRUANCE patrolling the eastern entrance of the SOH.

(21) No Iranian F-14's were challenged during the 2 – 17 June 1988 timeframe but seven were challenged in the 13 June – 2 July 1988 time period.

(22) Commercial air carriers have been observed changing IFF modes and codes when crossing the Persian Gulf area.

(23) Iranian military aircraft have been observed squawking all IFF (I, II, and III) modes and codes and at times follow commercial air routes within the Persian Gulf.

(24) Iraqi military aircraft have followed the air routes from Iraq during Persian Gulf shipping attack profile (SAP) missions and return using the same air routes.

(25) Iran Air Flight 655 was a regularly scheduled biweekly flight from Bandar Abbas to Sharjah, often referred to as a "HAJ" flight by ships' crews.

(26) CJTFME and CO USS VINCENNES discussed the complexity of the commercial air picture on several occasions prior to 3 July 1988.

(27) Airbus' normally climb at 350 – 370 KTS and cruise at 450 – 460 KTS.

b. Iran Air Flight 655