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 diplomatic and military support. This appeal should be exploited in the United Nations to demonstrate the aggressive character or Soviet communism. However major policy decisions would be required before active military support could be given by the United Nations.

(3) Unless compelling circumstances prevent it or other satisfactory arrangements can be made, the Saudi Arabian Government will he asked for permission to use Dhahran as a transit point in connection with contemplated U.S. covert operations.

(4) It is assumed that Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan would each feel threatened by a communist government in Iran and could, therefore, be expected to show sympathy for anti-communist Iranian elements. Diplomatic planning is directed toward insuring the greatest possible measure or cooperation of these countries in support of the non-communist Iranian Government. It should be recognized that the extent or cooperation provided by those countries would of course, be inﬂuenced by their appreciation of soviet reactions to any measures which they might initiate.

(5) The active cooperation of the British Government is of major importance in any plans which may be developed to meet this contingency. Every effort will be made through diplomatic means to secure this cooperation but the failure to secure U.K. support will not in itself prevent the U.S. from taking such measures as are possible to achieve our national objectives.

d. Psychological: No specific psychological measures have yet been planne for implementation in Iran in the event of an actual communist seizure of power.

e. Special Political Operations: (1) At the present time CIA has a stockpile of small arms, ammunition and demolition materiel under USAF cover, Wheelus Field, Tripoli. The stockpile is in quantity designed to supply a 10 000-man guerilla. force for six months without resupply. In other increments there is sufficient material to equip basically a 4000-man guerrilla force. (Locales of store are New Jersey, Ismailia Suez Canal Zone and Tripoli. CIA is now considering the feasibility of adding essential food stuffs and clothing to existing or other stockpiles. An estimate of such requirements is in the process of preparation.

(2) These supplies could, within 3 to 4 weeks, be transported by air and sea to certain strong tribal