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 3. Although many of the specfic plans required are still in the process of preperation be working Group submits herewith a Progress Report as of March 11, 1953, for the information of the members of the Council.

4. The Working Group desires to point out that in addition to the two conditions envisioned in paragraph 5-a of NBC 136/1, there is also the possibility that a communist seizure of power in Iran may take place imperceptibly over a considerable period of time. Under this contingency, it would be extremely difficult to identify and demonstrate to our allies that specific countermeasures were required to prevent communist infiltration from reaching the point where it would be able to significantly influence the policies of the Iranian Government. In such circumstances, it might be desirable to implement certain of the plans discussed in the attached Report, prior to an identifiable attempted or actual communist seizure of power.

5. Because of the sensitive nature of the information contained in this Progress Report it is requested that special security precautions be taken in its handling and that access be limited strictly to individuals requiring this information in the performance of their official duties.

1. Measures to be taken to support a non-communist Iranian Government in the event of an attempted communist seizure of power:

a. Military : Predicated on the assumption that the Iranian Government makes an appeal to the U.S. for direct military assistance the JCS have recognized three feasible U.S. military courses of action, namely:

(1) To conduct a show of force by periodic flights of carrier aircraft, or aircraft from land bases outside of Iran, over key centers. Recommendations concerning possible employment of U.S. naval and SAC units have been requested from CINELM and CGSAC, respectively. To data these recommendations have not been received.

(2) To assist the legal Iranian Army with logistic support by augmenting the present policy of arms aid. Since there is no way of foretelling whet assistance might be needed or requested by the Iranians, meaningful plans cannot be prepared in advance. However, the Chief of staff U.S. Army, could draw up the necessary plans very quickly when the necessary specific information became available.