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 In carrying out a, b, and c above, the United States should:

(1) Maintain full consultation with the United Kingdom.

(2) Avoid unnecessarily sacrificing legitimate United Kingdom interests or unneessarily impairing United States–United Kingdom relations.

(3) Not permit the United Kingdom to veto any United States actions which the United States considers essential to the achievement of the policy objective set forth above.

(14) Be prepared to avail itself of the authority of the President to approve voluntary agreements and programs under Section 708 (a.) and (b) of, the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended.

d. Recognize the strength of Iranian nationalist feeling; try to direct it into constructive channels end be ready to exploit any opportunity to do so, bearing in mind the desirability of strengthening in Iran the ability and desire of the Iranian people to resist communist pressure.

e. Continue present programs of military, economic and technical assistance to the extent they will help to restore stability and increase internal security, and be prepared to increase such assistance to support Iranian resistance to communist pressure.

f. Encourage the adoption by the Iranian Government of necessary financial, Judicial and administrative and other reforms.

g. Continue special political measures designed to assist in achieving the above purposes.

h. Plan now for the eventual inclusion of Iran in any regional defense arrengement which may he developed in the Middle East if such inclusion should later prove freasible.

5. In the event of either an attempted or an actual communist seizure of power in one or more of the provinces of Iran or in Theran, the United States should support a NSC 136/1