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 unnecessarily disparately impact an identified group based on the enumerated factors. 28 C.F.R. § 42.203. ''Cf. Charleston Housing Authority v. USDA'', 419 F.3d 729, 741–42 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding in the related Fair Housing Act context that where official action imposes a racially disparate impact, the action can only be justified through a showing that it is necessary to non-discriminatory objectives).

Thus, under these statutes, the discriminatory impact of Ferguson's law enforcement practices—which is both unnecessary and avoidable—is unlawful regardless of whether it is intentional or not. As set forth below, these practices also violate the prohibitions against intentional discrimination contained within Title VI, the Safe Streets Act, and the Fourteenth Amendment.

 Ferguson's Law Enforcement Practices Are Motivated in Part by Discriminatory Intent in Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and Other Federal Laws

The race-based disparities created by Ferguson's law enforcement practices cannot be explained by chance or by any difference in the rates at which people of different races adhere to the law. These disparities occur, at least in part, because Ferguson law enforcement practices are directly shaped and perpetuated by racial bias. Those practices thus operate in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, which prohibits discriminatory policing on the basis of race. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813; Johnson v. Crooks, 326 F.3d 995, 999 (8th Cir. 2003).

An Equal Protection Clause violation can occur where, as here, the official administration of facially neutral laws or policies results in a discriminatory effect that is motivated, at least in part, by a discriminatory purpose. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–40 (1976). In assessing whether a given practice stems from a discriminatory purpose, courts conduct a "sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available," including historical background, contemporaneous statements by decision makers, and substantive departures from normal procedure. ''Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266; United States v. Bell'', 86 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 1996). To violate the Equal Protection Clause, official action need not rest solely on racially discriminatory purposes; rather, official action violates the Equal Protection Clause if it is motivated, at least in part, by discriminatory purpose. ''Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney'', 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).

We have uncovered significant evidence showing that racial bias has impermissibly played a role in shaping the actions of police and court officials in Ferguson. That evidence, detailed below, includes: 1) the consistency and magnitude of the racial disparities found throughout police and court enforcement actions; 2) direct communications by police supervisors and court officials that exhibit racial bias, particularly against African Americans; 3) a number of other communications by police and court officials that reflect harmful racial stereotypes; 4) the background and historic context surrounding FPD's racially disparate enforcement practices; 5)