Page:Inquiry into the Principles and Policy of the Government of the United States.djvu/609

Rh of the general government, to that of sustaining it against the consent of an entire legislative mind.

The union is a compact bitvveen two distinct minds, state and popular. The two branches of its legislature, consist of the separate representatives of these two minds. Its health, peace, and perhaps its existence, depends upon the consent of both of these minds to law. If either could retain a law by which it had acquired an unforeseen superiority over the other, the dissatisfaction of the ensnared party would ensue, and the law itself would be a violation of the federal compact. The constitution provides for the consent of both of these minds to law, and a feudal form has introduced a mode of making it, against the consent of one, and sometimes against that of both; so that a portion of our laws are derived neither from consent, force, or fraud, but from the form of stating a question ', a source which Aristotle himself has overlooked.

In a state legislature, composed of two branches representing one mind or body politick, a concurrence of some portion of this mind must attend the continuance of every law. In congress, the representatives of the state mind may prevent the repeal of law, which will then continue against the will of the entire popular mind, or against the will of the states, if the repeal is prevented by the popular representatives. Or if the repeal is prevented by the president, the law continues, somewhat equivocally on account of his representative character, against the will of both minds.

A perfect consolidated government guided by the popular mind, or a perfect federal government guided by the will of the states, would be very different from the existing general government. To prevent fraud or accident from destroying by means of law, the equilibrium between these contracting minds, as established by the constitution, both should be free, and neither able to retain an intended or accidental legal advantage over the other. If either of the political contracting parties composing the union, keeps the other subject to a law contrary to its will, it is equivalent to keep-