Page:Inquiry into the Principles and Policy of the Government of the United States.djvu/237

Rh strength, is exactly the same question. A long official tenure will produce in both cases the same effects. If an independence of the will of constituents, for a period almost amounting to the probable duration of the incumbent's life, would instil aristocratical principles into the functionaries substituted to preserve democratical rights between individuals, the same cause will instil the same principles into those constituted to preserve the same rights between states. The infusion must be healthy or poisonous as to both objects, or as to neither; and the question simply is, whether it is good or bad; and not whether it is of the singular quality, to cure, drank out of one cup, but to kill from another ; just as the same popish relict will draw down blessings upon the orthodox, and curses upon the heretical.

But the exposure of legislative power to executive influence, is unquestionably I he heel of Achilles, omitted to be immortalized by an ablution in good moral principles, and left exposed to the poisoned shafts of corruption. The division and responsibility of power, and the independence of political departments of each other, are the vital principles of our policy.

The legislature, as the most powerful political department, ought not to be influenced by one less powerful, because a weaker power able to make a stronger subservient to its views, acquires an unconstitutional force. What can exceed the absurdity, of considering the principle of separating departments, and delegating different powers to each, as essential to a free government; and yet providing an influence for executive over legislative power, which enables it really to legislate, contrary both to the theory and letter of the constitution? The king of England would be a weaker power, than an independent House of Commons fairly elected; yet, the influence which annexes their power to his makes him irresistable. Congress, as constituting a complete legislature, was intended to be placed in a state of far greater independence of the president, than the lords and commons were of the king.