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ARI works. The Organon includes the Categories; the book on Interpretation; the two books of the Prior Analytics; the two books of the Posterior Analytics; the eight books of the Topics; and the Arguments of the Sophists. This work is devoted to exposing the formal laws of the thinking faculty, or the mode in which, through virtue of the necessity of its constitution, the Mind must proceed towards the discovery of Truth. It has nothing to do with positive Truth itself, but only with the legitimate or only possible means by which Truth can be established. An enterprise undertaken for the first time, and, as accomplished by the Stagyrite, accomplished for ever. Even Kant and Hegel have asserted, that no philosopher has either added to the logic of Aristotle, or taken anything away from it,—an assertion literally true, notwithstanding the long labours of our lamented Hamilton.—It is curious to notice how Bacon permitted himself, in wilful misconception, to write concerning the Organon. But Time is the grand corrector; the throne of the Stagyrite is secure!—The treatise on Metaphysics is much more abstruse, and wholly incapable of being briefly analysed. It, on the contrary, does not concern mere forms of any kind; it is a treatise on Being in itself, or, on Ontology properly so called; it is the theory of first principles—principles lying wholly beyond the domain of material observation. It has been commented on times without number,—very recently by Cousin; but the student will find much more help from the laborious and acute work by Ravaisson. There is also a recent Latin translation accompanied by a critical commentary, from the pen of Zevort.—We cannot terminate our mere "list of contents," better than in the words in which St. Hilaire graphically describes the historical fates of this vast mass of thought: "It was the Logic that first made its way among the Greek and Latin schools. Not being required to accept any positive system, every one hastened to study and comment on the Organon; the Fathers of the church, and, after them, all Christians, were ardent as the Gentiles; and the middle ages did not hesitate to attribute to St. Augustin an abridgment of the Categories. Boethius in the sixth century translated the Organon. The Greek commentators were numerous, even after the schools of Alexandria had been shut by the decree of Justinian. The study of logic did not cease an instant at Constantinople, or in Western Europe. Bede, Isidore of Seville, cultivated it in the seventh century, as Alcuin in the eighth, at the German courts. It was the Organon that, in the eleventh century, gave birth to the quarrel between nominalism and realism, and to all the teaching of Abelard. Towards the close of the twelfth century, several other of Aristotle's works were introduced into Europe, or, more probably, they were then discovered; and from that date, his metaphysical and physical doctrines began to assume an influence. The church became alarmed, because these doctrines provoked and authorized heresies. An envoy was sent by the pope to inspect the university of Paris,—the centre and focus of modern learning and intelligence; and in 1210, all the works of Aristotle—the logic excepted—were condemned to be burnt: not only was every one forbidden to read them, but it was enjoined on those who had read them, to forget what they had read. The precaution was useless; it came too late. The example of the Arabs, who had no master in their schools save Aristotle, and who, according to their wont, had translated and commented on all his writings; the irresistible wants of the spirit of the time, which loudly demanded a larger sphere than that within which the church had confined intelligence for five or six centuries; the prudence even of the church itself, now returned to a wiser policy,—all conspired to break down artificial barriers; and after some fruitless efforts, the dike was opened, and the torrent rushed out in every direction. For nearly four centuries liberty then reigned through the schools,—sufficient to nourish all minds. Albertus Magnus commented on the whole works of the Stagyrite; Thomas Aquinas explained some of their more difficult portions; a crowd of illustrious doctors immediately followed their example; and Aristotle, translated by the care of Pope Urban V. and of Cardinal Bessarion, became forthwith, in respect to science, that which the Fathers of the church, or even Scripture itself, were in relation to faith. It is not requisite to remark, that in this case, as with religion, enthusiasm and blind submission quickly overpassed all limits. No one was allowed to think otherwise than Aristotle; and every doctrine set up against one of his, was equivalent to a heresy Suffice it to recall the deplorable fate of Ramus who perished, more as the victim of his courageous resistance to this philosophical despotism, than because of his doubtful opinions; suffice it that so late as 1629, in the reign of Louis XIII., a decree of parliament awarded the punishment of death to the authors of attacks on the system of Aristotle. Happily, this prohibition was yet more ridiculous than odious. But what is curious,—after some hesitation, protestantism adopted Aristotle as ardently as the catholic church. Melancthon introduced his writings into the Lutheran schools. The society of Jesus adopted the peripatetic philosophy in its entireness; and with its peculiar ability, turned it against all bold thinkers of the time, and especially against the adherents of Des Cartes. It was not until the eighteenth century—a century victorious over so many other abuses—that this one also came to an end. Aristotle reigned no more, except in our seminaries; the manuals of philosophy in use among ecclesiastical establishments were, and still are, nothing but a dry resumé of his doctrine. But the general reaction went to excess, in spite of the wise counsels of Leibnitz; the Stagyrite was treated with that unjust disdain with which men had begun to regard the whole past. Even the gravest historians of philosophy—among others, Brucker—could not do him justice. The yoke had been broken too recently, and men could not forget how oppressive it was. At last, however, Aristotle has assumed the place in philosophy which is unquestionably due to him. Thanks to Kant, to Hegel, to Brandis, in Germany, that the study of Aristotle did not altogether perish; thanks to Cousin among ourselves, the great doctrines of the Greek philosopher are now at once better known, and more accurately appreciated." Thanks, we beg to add, still more, to our Scottish Sir William Hamilton!

III.—This sketch of Aristotle—even in reference to the minute scale on which it has necessarily been planned—would be wholly incomplete, without an effort to discriminate, briefly, the position, on the long roll of philosophy, occupied by so profound a thinker, in reference to those grand questions, whose solution, final or approximate, is the aim and end of the highest science. To accomplish, in so far as it is possible, the object now indicated, we shall analyse shortly Aristotle's works on the Soul and on Ethics, and then sum up what we conceive to be his Theodicy.

1. The treatise , or concerning the soul. The work, whose contents and character we are about to explain, is at once the most satisfactory, and, with the exception perhaps of the Metaphysics, the most difficult of Aristotle's. It is well known that, on the death of the philosopher at Chalcis, his manuscripts were found in a perplexing condition. Few of them were arranged, and many of the most important of his dissertations bore evident marks of incompleteness. Nor were they edited as they then might have been: hence the doubts and differences of opinion among all subsequent editors. The treatise is almost the only exception. Aristotle left it finished; nor does the compactness of its structure, and the logical arrangement and dependence of its parts, leave room for question. Nevertheless it is most difficult. With all the help rendered by Trendlenberg—its best editor—the student will find it very hard to master. The expression of Aristotle is ever concise; so fearful was he of being drawn aside by one hair's-breadth from the quest after pure truth, that his conciseness increased as his subject rose in difficulty and loftiness. While inquiring into the nature of the Soul, this character of his style seems to have reached its culmination. The subtlety and arduousness of the subject, too, appear in one respect to have almost overborne Aristotle. His opinions are sometimes not decided, insomuch that the most opposite views have been attributed to him. But the perusal and study of the will reward any effort. The inquirer will find in it exquisite analyses of the senses,—the first exemplification, also on a large scale, of that inductive psychology, the honour of originating which has been erroneously given to the Scottish school,—one of the finest and most accurate views ever taken of the functions of the vital principle, accompanied by indications of many of those general truths which are now accepted as elements of our comparative physiology; and here, also, lie the germs and the causes of the chief of those philosophical disputes that gave intellectual activity to the middle ages. Eschewing details, however, and all special questions, let us glance at the essential characteristics of this elaborate treatise. Aristotle's method, in the present case, is alike marked and pregnant. Urged by his unresting desire to discover the whole, to which any special phenomena may seem to belong, he casts a glance