Page:Impeachment of Donald J. Trump, President of the United States — Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives.pdf/156

 Presidential immunity from civil damages. In so doing, it emphasized that this rule "will not leave the Nation without sufficient protection against misconduct on the part of the Chief Executive," since "there remains the constitutional remedy of impeachment." The Court pointedly added that "[v]igilant oversight by Congress also may serve to deter Presidential abuses of office, as well as to make credible the threat of impeachment." This statement constituted a recognition by the Court that the House cannot effectively exercise its impeachment power without the ability to undertake "vigilant oversight."

Over the following years, several federal courts agreed. In 1984, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit emphasized that impeachment inquiries require courts to place a heavy thumb on the scale in favor of turning over materials to Congressional investigators. Three years later, a district judge elaborated that courts have limited power to constrain legislative investigations in an impeachment setting: "Ancillary to the sole power of impeachment vested in the House by the Constitution is the power to disclose the evidence that it receives as it sees fit. Again, recognition of the doctrine of separation of powers precludes the judiciary from imposing restrictions on the exercise of the impeachment power." In affirming this decision, the Eleventh Circuit noted that "[p]ublic confidence in a procedure as political and public as impeachment is an important consideration justifying disclosure" of grand jury materials to Congress.

More recent opinions have echoed these points. As one judge observed, when "subpoenas [are] issued in connection with an impeachment proceeding . . . . Congress's investigatory powers are at their peak." Other judges have more broadly emphasized the public interest in obtaining Executive Branch