Page:Impeachment of Donald J. Trump, President of the United States — Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives.pdf/125

 Committee agreed on the basic definition of common law bribery: it occurs where a President (1) offers, solicits, or accepts (2) something of personal value (3) to influence the official duties he is entrusted with exercising by the American people; (4) corruptly. The experts also agreed that an impeachable offense need not be a crime.

Two aspects of this definition merit special note. First, at the time of the Constitutional Convention, bribery was well understood in Anglo-American law to encompass soliciting bribes. As Judge John T. Noonan, Jr. explains, the drafting history of the Impeachment Clause demonstrates that "'Bribery' was read both actively and passively, including the chief magistrate bribing someone and being bribed." In a renowned bribery case involving the alleged solicitation of bribes, Lord Mansfield explained that "[w]herever it is a crime to take, it is a crime to give: they are reciprocal." William Blackstone likewise confirmed that "taking bribes is punished," just as bribery is punishable for "those who offer a bribe, though not taken." In addition, at common law, soliciting a bribe—even if it is not accepted—completes the offense of bribery. "[T]he attempt is a crime; it is complete on his side who offers it."

Second, under common law, bribery occurred when the thing offered or solicited was of personal value to the recipient. Common law treatises explained that a bribe broadly encompassed "any