Page:Immigration and the Commissioners of Emigration of the state of New York.djvu/204

176 indemnify the public should they become paupers." (Grove vs. Slaughter, 15 Pet., 549.) "The police power of the States cannot draw within its jurisdiction objects which lie beyond it."

"The police power," says Catron, J., same side, "proves too much, and does not apply to persons in good health and of good character. The object cannot sanctify the means. The act is not in execution of any supposed State right to exclude all aliens, because nothing of the sort is attempted. No such right exists; it would be incompatible with the exclusive right of Congress to make war, peace, and treaties, regulate commerce, and naturalize aliens. The persons and property taxed had not yet come under State jurisdiction, because they could not be taxed without taxing either tonnage or imports."

"The States," says Wayne, J., same side, "have given away all control of commerce, except that of regulating internal trade. The motive cannot save a law if it practically operates in a regulation of commerce. Milne's case established no more than the right of each State to be informed of the name and quality of every foreigner that arrives. The States have retained no more police power than is necessary to their internal government. No point was ruled in Milne's case which gives any support to the law now in question. The fear that the decision (of the majority) will be held to prevent the slave States from forbidding the introduction of freedmen from the West Indies is unfounded. That case would be an exception to the present rule, because the Constitution must be interpreted according to its subject-matter. The fundamental idea was, that slavery should remain undisturbed by the Federal Government. What had the majority of the judges in Milne's case was the point that the duty to report was a police regulation, and, therefore, not unconstitutional. The court never intended, in Milne's case, to derogate from Gibbons vs. Ogden or Brown vs. Maryland." The dissenting opinions, however, assume exactly contrary grounds. "The fundamental question," says Taney, C. J. (p. 464), "is: Has the Federal Government power to compel States to receive, and suffer to mingle with its citizens, any person or class of persons? I had thought the negative established by Holmes vs. Jennison, 14 Peters, 540; Grove vs. Slaughter, 15 Peters, 449; Prigg vs. The