Page:Immigration and the Commissioners of Emigration of the state of New York.djvu/183

Rh But granting, for the sake of argument, that immigration is a matter of national concern, it is doubtful if anything but evil would result from abandoning a system which has fully realized its purpose which has been tried and perfected by the experience of nearly a quarter of a century; whose operations are greatly facilitated by being concentrated upon a comparatively small area, and the agents under which are few, practised, and under the immediate supervision of a Board of unsalaried and non-partisan Commissioners, located and laboring on the spot. To replace such a system by the clumsy machinery of a central board, or by a single Commissioner, stationed at an inland city, remote from the chief objective points of foreign immigration, with an unwieldy multitude of subordinates scattered over the land, whose irresponsibility would inevitably increase in the direct ratio of their distance from the seat of authority, would be worse than unreasonable. The transfer to the National Government of the control of the immigrant would lead to quarrels, heart-burnings, and jealousies among the States, as the controlling officers would certainly be required to use their power to influence the current of immigration. The effect would undoubtedly be to so increase the cost of supporting the immigrant, as either to quadruple the present tax, and then make it virtually a prohibitory one, or to impose the burden on the national treasury, and thus make the immigrant the nation's pauper.

It is obvious that the General Government would encounter a great many more insurmountable obstacles and be called upon to remedy more evils than are met with under the present system. In the first instance, the institutions for the protection of the immigrant would have to be largely extended, and instead of one place like Castle Garden, a dozen would be required. Besides the Eastern and Southern and Western ports, the large inland cities, like Cincinnati, Chicago, St. Louis, Milwaukee, and St. Paul, would have to be provided with the same proportionate facilities as New York. Thus the General Government would be obliged to sustain ten establishments, while the income derived from the commutation would remain the same. At a very low estimate, the Government would have to pay at least one million of dollars per year out of its coffers for this purpose. In itself, this