Page:Immediate Experience and Mediation.djvu/9

 it is impossible not to regret that he published, comparatively speaking, so little. There are certain philosophical subjects on which he was uniquely qualified to write. If, e. g., he had published, out of the fullness of his knowledge, a critical estimate of the more recent developments of Symbolic Logic, or, again, an edition of Plato's Timaeus, he would have given to the philosophical world works of the very greatest value. And yet, though such a feeling of regret is natural, there is another side to the question. For a Professor's work, interpreted as Cook Wilson interpreted it, is more than enough to absorb a man's whole strength and energy. He won for himself the love and reverence of many generations of pupils; he established a splendid tradition for his Chair; he spent himself unsparingly in the service of Philosophy. Who shall presume to say 'He might have done more', or 'He should have done otherwise'?

That all our knowledge rests in the end on immediate experience, that all mediation is grounded on immediacy, may pass at first sight for one of 'those clear truths that either their own evidence forces us to admit, or common experience makes it impudence to deny'. The statement, in one form or another, is common enough. It comes to us like an old and familiar friend whom we have hot the heart to distrust. Yet we shall find it