Page:Iamblichus on the Mysteries of the Egyptians, Chaldeans, and Assyrians (IA b24884170).pdf/96

64 natures, but as with divine forms, and with the Gods themselves [as Gods, i. e. as superessential hyparxes]. So that we have sufficiently spoken in opposition to this division.

difference which separates "Gods from dæmons by the corporeal and incorporeal," is the next thing that follows in what you have written; this being much more common than the former difference, and yet it is so far from expressing the peculiarities of their essence, that it does not afford a conjectural knowledge of them, nor of any accidents which pertain to them. For neither is it possible from these things to apprehend whether they are animals or not, and whether they are deprived of life, or are not at all in want of it. Farther still, neither is it easy to conjecture how these names are predicated, whether in common, or of many different things. For if in common, it is absurd that a line and time, God and dæmons, fire and water, should be under the same incorporeal genus. But if of many things, what reason is there when you speak of the incor