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, syringes, not far from the Egyptian Thebes. The second Hermes interpreted these pillars, and his interpretation formed many volumes, as Iamblichus informs us in Section viii. of this work. These pillars are mentioned by Laertius in his Life of Democritus; by Dio Chrysostom in Orat. 49; by Achilles Tatius on Aratus; and by others of the ancients.

P. 15. There is, therefore, the good itself which is beyond essence, and there is that good which subsists according to essence. There are three orders of good; viz. that which is imparticipable and superessential; that which is imparticipable and essential; and that which is essential and participable. Of these, the last is such as our nature contains; the good which ranks among forms is essential; and that which is beyond essence is superessential. Or we say that the good which subsists in us may be considered as a habit, in consequence of subsisting in a subject; the next to this ranks as essence, and a part of essence, I mean the good which ranks among forms; and the good which is beyond essence, is neither a habit, nor a part. With respect to the good, also, which subsists according to essence, it must be observed, that since forms are twofold, some alone distinguishing the essences of the things fashioned by form, but others their perfections, the genus of essence, same and different, and the form of animal, horse, and man, and every thing of this kind, give distinction to essence and subjects; but the form of the good, the beautiful, and the just, and in like manner the form of virtue, of health, strength, and every thing of a similar nature, are perfective of the beings to which they belong: and of some, essence is the leader, but of others the good. For, as Plato says, every thing except the one, must necessarily participate of essence; and whatever preserves, gives perfection to, or defends any being, must be good. Hence, since these two are leaders, the one of forms which give subsistence to things, and the other of such as are the sources of their perfection; it is necessary that one of these should be subordinate to the other; I mean that the good which is allotted a coordination among forms that are the sources of perfection, should be subordinate to essence, which ranks among causes, whence subsistence originates, if the good is being, and a certain being. For it is either the same with, or different from, essence, which the Elean guest or stranger in the Sophista of Plato shows to be the genus of being. And if the good is the same with