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 threat from international terrorism at that time – just a year after the 2005 terror attacks which claimed the lives of 52 people – had to be the primary focus.

73.If we consider the Russian threat to have been clearly indicated in 2006 with the murder of Alexander Litvinenko, and then take events such as the annexation of Crimea in 2014 as firmly underlining Russian intent on the global stage, the question is whether the Intelligence Community should – and could – have reacted more quickly and increased operational effort on Russia. On figures alone, it could be said that they took their eye off the ball; nevertheless, the Heads of MI5, SIS, GCHQ and Defence Intelligence all sought to defend against this suggestion. MI5 was clear that there was an inevitable reprioritisation due to the terrorist threat:

"… back then it's how can we possibly do enough to get ahead of this appalling terrorism problem which … back then was larger than we could see the edges of and one of the things we used to say about it, at exactly the time you're talking about, was we haven't yet found the edges of this problem."

Defence Intelligence viewed it similarly:

"So in terms of relative prioritisation, rather than losing focus … our coverage of Russia undoubtedly suffered as a consequence of that prioritisation, which was necessary for the conduct of military operations."

By comparison, SIS and GCHQ saw it as due to the longer lead time required for work on Russia. SIS said:

"I don't think we did take our eye off the ball. I think the appetite for work against the Russian threat has sort of waxed and waned. ***."

And GCHQ agreed:

"A bit like [SIS's] point, some of the kind of hardcore capabilities that were necessary to keep in the business we maintained and then, really, as the reviews and the discussion around what happened in Crimea really brought minds more to the fore again on Russia, that then led us to move in ramping up again."

74.We fully recognise the very considerable pressures on the Agencies since 9/11, and that they have a finite amount of resource, which they must focus on operational priorities. Nevertheless, reacting to the here and now is inherently inefficient and – in our opinion – until recently, the Government had badly underestimated the Russian threat and the response it required.

75.Accepting the counter-terrorism pressures on the operational organisations, there is nevertheless a question over the approach taken by the policy departments. We have previously discussed the extent to which economic policy dictated the opening up of the UK to Russian investment. This indicates a failure of the security policy departments to engage with this issue – to the extent that the UK now faces a threat from Russia within its own borders. What appears to have been a somewhat laissez-faire policy approach is less easy to forgive than the response of the busy Agencies. We welcome the fact that this has now been recognised and appears to be changing.