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HMG Resourcing given that China is now recognised as an enduring national security challenge. In 2021, we were told that a one-year annual uplift had been granted to the Agencies' China mission ***

The Agencies also advised the Committee that this increased funding would be allocated to promoting resilience, specifically to:

"support modest investment in MI5's efforts to raise awareness and provide advice to government and Industry on China-related threats, and the delivery of a more finely tuned response to the economic threat posed by China to the UK's Critical National Infrastructure and Science, Technology and Critical Knowledge sectors, and enabling us to better detect threats of hostile investment through data analysis."

However, the Agencies were clear that this additional funding was only a stop-gap: "Whilst these investments allow us to grow and maintain critical mission capabilities, further growth in SR21 [Spending Review 2021] is required to enable us to respond to the sheer scale of the China threat." Director GCHQ reinforced this message, telling the Committee: "Russia has given us some really crappy weather but China is giving us the climate. We really have to think strategically and long term [about China]."

The National Cyber Force (NCF)—a partnership between GCHQ and the Ministry of Defence, including elements from SIS and the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory—was also announced as part of the Spending Review. The Intelligence Community told us that the NCF is expected to improve and increase the UK's cyber capability and "enhance the UK's position and reputation as a top-tier cyber power". NCF priorities are derived from NSC priorities and are set through a forum chaired by the Deputy National Security Adviser, separate from the IOP process described (although we were told that IOP Plans do inform and are reflected in NCF priorities). We have been told that, since the NCF started operating, it had been able to expose and counter false narratives ***. Countering interference was cited as another area *** for the NCF ***.

In addition to the uplift under the Spending Review, MI5 has been able to increase the number of people working on the China threat area (from September 2020 to March 2022), doubling the overall effort on ***. ***. The Intelligence Community noted: