Page:ISC-China.pdf/72

CHINA

The objectives of pillar 5 are to: protect UK innovation and security, shape the norms and standards of emerging technology in line with UK values; embed human rights and the rule of law, and manage risk ***.

The seven strands under 'Digital and Technology' include, but are not limited to, themes such as: increasing supply chain resilience; maintaining influence over global technology standards; and promoting the UK's vision and norms ***.

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In September 2020, we were provided with a list of actions planned under this pillar, including the (then) Telecommunications (Security) Bill, which set out guidelines for Telecommunications Network Operators, new powers for HMG in relation to high-risk vendors, and wider HMG work with international partners to diversify the telecommunications supply chain.

Other actions included: establishment of an Emerging Tech Board to identify nationally important technologies and assess opportunities and risks relating to them, the National Data Strategy, intended to ensure that data use is effective, efficient, ethical and secure; the establishment of a Digital Standards team ***; examination of rules around UK public sector procurement to see if companies potentially damaging to UK national security *** can be excluded from tendering for contracts; and raising awareness of relevant risks with British companies that wish to collaborate with Chinese digital and technology companies.

W. The Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021 does not contain provision for effective oversight of the new measures being implemented. The Act provides that notification of a company or person being a 'high-risk vendor' of telecommunications equipment, and specification of the limits placed on the use of this equipment, be laid before Parliament unless provision of this information is deemed to be contrary to national security. In such circumstances it is logical—and in keeping with Parliament's intent in establishing the ISC—that this information should instead be provided to the ISC. This would ensure that Parliament could be duly notified without this information being made public and thereby endangering national security. However, this proposed amendment was rejected wholesale by the Government. This was particularly inappropriate—and, indeed, ironic—as it was the ISC that had originally raised concerns about the adoption of Huawei in the UK telecommunications network. It was our initiative that prompted the Government to introduce this legislation.