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At the beginning of this Inquiry, work to counter Chinese interference appeared very much to be a work in progress ***. The Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) for China told the Committee that this work was "***". The SRO told us that it had been considered by the National Strategy Implementation Group (NSIG) ***:

"*** it is certainly one of the top priorities where I think we have got to *** gain the understanding and then the response that we need. ***"

In early 2020, HMG told the Committee that, since ***, the China NSIG has subsequently discussed Chinese interference ***, and later that year, work being done on Chinese interference in the UK was noted in evidence to the Committee.

It is clear that Chinese interference has become a higher priority than it was when we began this Inquiry. Evidence that we have seen has noted that the Government is increasing its efforts to combat Chinese information operations particularly through:

the cross-Whitehall counter-disinformation unit working to create a comprehensive picture of the extent, scope and potential impact of disinformation; and ***.

We examine the effectiveness of the response to Chinese interference in the chapter on Defending the UK.

T. We commend the action now being taken by the Government to counter interference by China—it is encouraging that the Government has finally woken up to the grave threat this poses to our national security.

U. However, it is worrying that 'policy ownership' of this national security activity, rather than being gripped at the centre by the Cabinet Office, has instead been devolved across the Government—in many instances to departments with no security remit or expertise. We have not been kept informed of these developments and, despite numerous requests, are not permitted to scrutinise this activity.

V. Effective Parliamentary oversight is not some kind of 'optional extra'—it is a vital safeguard in any functioning Parliamentary democracy, and the ISC is the only body that can do that. Moving responsibility for security matters to bodies not named in the ISC's Memorandum of Understanding is not consistent with Parliament's intent in the Justice and Security Act 2013: the Government should not be giving departments a licence to operate in the name of national security and hiding it from view.