Page:ISC-China.pdf/50

CHINA *** because we are in close partnership with our Five Eyes counterparts, we can draw … learning *** and be alive to the possible vectors of influence that might be brought to bear within our own system.

However, it appears that there are numerous instances of activity at the lower end of the influence/interference spectrum, and establishing whether approaches were legitimate lobbying on behalf of the Chinese embassy or whether there is the potential for an approach to develop into something inappropriate is not necessarily straightforward. By way of example, we were told that there had been cases of China offering to supply research staff to MPs.

Political interference has also been seen to include a degree of coercion. For example, in 2014 the Chinese state made it clear that it would refuse Members of the Foreign Affairs Committee entry to Hong Kong because it considered the Committee's Inquiry into Hong Kong to be an unacceptable interference in its affairs. The visit was cancelled, and the incident sparked a (somewhat muted) diplomatic protest from the UK Government. In March 2021, the Chinese state sanctioned five MPs and two Members of the House of Lords in response to their work publicising the human rights abuses of the Uighur population in Xinjiang. It appears that the Chinese approach to countering the *** (*** ).

However, distinguishing overt lobbying from covert or malign activity, and identifying relationships between UK-based actors and CCP-associated agencies or officials upstream ***

There have been a number of high-profile examples of former UK officials being recruited by Chinese companies. The case that received the most scrutiny is that of John Suffolk, formerly the Government Chief Information Officer (2006–2011) and later, at the time of writing, Huawei's Global Head of Cyber Security.

In January 2011, as the then Government Chief Information Officer, Mr Suffolk travelled to China with GCHQ and BT to brief Huawei on serious security issues that GCHQ had discovered with Huawei's equipment. Mr Suffolk's participation in the visit demonstrates the importance of his role in managing the risk associated with Huawei. Just one month later, Mr Suffolk applied for permission to join Huawei as their first Global Head of Cyber Security. (It is unclear whether Mr Suffolk had been offered the role prior to the January 2011 trip, and if so, whether the Government knew about it.)