Page:ISC-China.pdf/49

Interference It appears that China has a high level of intent to interfere with the UK Government, targeting officials and bodies at a range of levels to influence UK political thinking and decision-making relevant to China ***. Examples of such actions include:

UK-based individuals associated with the UFWD and other CCP-linked groups have encouraged individuals, including those with Chinese heritage, whom they judge to have views that align with those of the CCP, to pursue political office.

UFWD-linked individuals received funds from overseas sources for onward donation to political parties, prospective Parliamentary candidates (PPCs) ***.

There have been attempts at a more generic political influence over a broader range of members of relevant legislatures (MRLs) who the UFWD perceive to be sympathetic to the Chinese world view and CCP priorities.

In ***, MI5 investigations of the activities of several Chinese intelligence officers working *** in the UK, identified one of the intelligence officers gaining access to at least one UK Parliamentarian ***.

***

Targets are not necessarily limited to serving politicians either. They can include former political figures, if they are sufficiently high profile. For example, it is possible that David Cameron's role as Vice President of a £1bn China-UK investment fund (itself an initiative of Lord Chadlington), and Sir Danny Alexander's February 2016 appointment as Vice President of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), were in some part engineered by the Chinese state to lend credibility to Chinese investment, as well as to the broader China brand ***.

Security briefings are provided to politicians, including those who are targeted, and MI5 is able to take action where an attempt at interference is made:

"In one case ***"

GCHQ observed that China frequently targeted Parliamentarians in their cyber operations ***.

The UK does not appear to have suffered from some of the more egregious examples of Chinese political interference publicly disclosed in, for example, Australia and New Zealand. We note, for example, the public case of an Australian investigation into Chinese government interference within the office of an Australian Parliamentarian. In October 2020, MI5 told the Committee: