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CHINA bribery and coercion. This also includes attempts to interfere in our democracy or Government policy making, including through interference in national, regional or local elections and referenda, as well as attempts to undermine academic freedoms. A number of states conduct persistent activity which attempts to distort UK and international information environments through the use of information operations which often play on existing divisions.

China's interference activities are as with all its activity—primarily driven by the CCP's twin imperatives of: "[ensuring] regime stability by defending against threats at home and overseas"; and "[promoting] its political and economic interests overseas in order to bolster its rise as a global power". HMG assesses that "China has increasingly deployed aggressive propaganda and disinformation techniques to shape the information landscape and propagate narratives which promote the CCP's approach whilst denigrating the West." However, the two are very much linked—unlike in the case of Russia. Charles Parton has previously explained that "unlike Moscow, Beijing's interference is not aimed at subverting the West, but represents a rigorous, ruthless advancement of China's interests and values at the expense of those of the West".

While the Chinese clearly do interfere overseas when it serves their perceived national interest, they nevertheless strongly resist accusations of interference—in part because they do not wish foreign powers to interfere in China's own affairs. Again, Charles Parton said, "their whole narrative is that they don't interfere in other countries, so you should not interfere in the way they run their Confucian society". This stems from the deeply held fear that civil society organisations and global movements (in particular, those supposedly 'created' or 'supported' by Western democracies) calling for democratic accountability in China would challenge the legitimacy of CCP rule. Professor Steve Tsang noted that "the Chinese saw from the 1990s onwards that colour revolutions ultimately would have China as the final ultimate goal, and they don't want that to happen ever".

China can be seen seeking to interfere with UK politicians, senior officials and military personnel, and they can be increasingly seen to interfere in the media, in Academia (covered in detail in the Case Study on Academia) and in relation to the Chinese diaspora.

The JIC Chair told us, "[the Chinese government] will certainly be seeking contact and to sustain relationships with elites … [and] decision-makers in different walks of life". Political decision-makers will therefore, inevitably, be targets of activity by the Chinese state—probably by the United Front Work Department (UFWD).