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CHINA individual via social media whom he believed to be a Chinese recruiter. He now believed the individuals whom he had met in China to be from the ChIS.

According to Mallory, he had been tasked by the ChIS with producing two open source research papers on US policy matters. He had been paid $25,000 for the work and he expected to be paid a similar amount for work during a forthcoming trip to China in June 2017. He had also been encouraged to seek employment with the US Government. He had been given a covert communication device by the ChIS and was trained in how to use it. He agreed to supply the device to the FBI for investigation.

When demonstrating how the device worked, Mallory showed the FBI interviewers messages that had been sent whilst in 'secure message' mode. Mallory was surprised, as he had understood that all of the secure messages were automatically deleted by the device. Upon further technical examination of the device, the FBI recovered further messages in which Mallory made reference to deleting top security classification markers on documents that he was sending on the device. The FBI established that four documents had been sent on the device, including one classified as TOP SECRET and two classified as SECRET.

Kevin Mallory was sentenced to 20 years in prison, followed by 5 years of supervised release.

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*** the widespread targeting of foreign students in China. ***

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In ***, MI5 became aware of a British student in China *** who had been cultivated by ChIS officers. As the relationship progressed, the student introduced the officers to a friend ***

*** an attempt by the ChIS to seed someone into one of the UK Agencies as a recruit. ***

China has a large and highly effective cyber espionage capability, consisting of official elements of both the MSS and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and a range of non-official