Page:ISC-China.pdf/41



The Ministry of State Security (MSS) *** lead on China's human intelligence (HUMINT) collection through both covert and overt operations, run both overseas and in China. Intelligence officers (predominantly based in China) send individuals overseas as business executives, academics, students etc., who seek to establish themselves in positions of value, embed themselves in local society and qualify for host nationality status. Intelligence is then fed back to a controlling officer based in China via visits, social media or other electronic communications.

Commentators have noted the ChIS's sophisticated use of open source information to compile and catalogue lists of individuals and organisations that may be useful to China's aims, and how the ChIS embed themselves in positions to be able to direct information and knowledge back to China. The MSS also uses commercial, diplomatic and journalistic cover to access persons of interest and influence and conduct operations. They focus on gathering valuable open source information and cultivating contacts in government, business and local Chinese communities. These 'cultivees' are not necessarily agents (***) and, given that MSS officers are working under cover, they often are not aware they are talking to the MSS. MI5 explained:

"what the Chinese will do is sift what they can from many, many, many sources, many people, and to do that you don't really need for this British person or academic to kind of radically alter their view of the whole universe, you just need them to, sort of, give you some articles or some insights or a certain amount of influence that is useful to you, and the British person who is doing this in some cases may even remain genuinely unwitting as to what they have done, or more often, I suppose, they probably half know that they haven't done something wholly noble, but they never have to quite confront the fact that they are in some sense betraying the advantage of their nation."

***.

The ChIS routinely target foreign diplomats and embassy officials in China and its near abroad, and there has been greater scrutiny of HMG staff in China *** in recent years ***. China has been developing increasingly pervasive coverage, and technical and legal powers, and it has almost certainly been using these and other espionage levers ***. Although until recently the ChIS did not routinely engage in harassment, there has been increasing harassment of Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) staff based in and travelling to China ***. Recent examples of ChIS action *** include entering their accommodation, close surveillance and IT incidents ***. It is possible that this increase